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‘Freedom is the right to tell people what they do
not want to hear.’ (George Orwell)
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense
of people living in accordance with its traditional
laws and political values, comes not from terrorism
but from laws such as these. This is the true mea-
sure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for
Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists
such a victory.1
Introduction
Feeling safe does not seem to go hand in hand with
liberty. An important balancing exercise ensues when
steps are taken by the state to respond to a perceived
threat to national security and, at the same time, ensure
that in acting in the interests of society to answer these
threats, basic civil liberties are not undermined. Con-
cerning this delicate and fraught process, Gross and Ni
Aola´in aptly observe:
‘Balancing – taking into consideration the threats,
dangers, and risks that need to be met, the probabil-
ity of their occurrence, and the costs for society and
its members of meeting those risks in different
ways – may be thus heavily biased, even when
applied with the best of intentions.’ (2007, p. 74)
Developments since 9/11 have resulted in the systematic
modification of laws by governments keen to respond to
terrorism and which take discretionary forms of execu-
tive powers. In the United Kingdom and the United
States, for example, a series of laws, pre-emptive in nat-
ure and, as such, highly problematic, have been passed
by legislatures and challenged in the courts.2
Scholars are once again compelled to ponder the
questions concerning the law and its legitimacy.
Viewing these questions as integral to the rule of law
and democracy, they are especially concerned with
recent government action that seemingly rejects the
values of the rule of law and that simultaneously raises
doubts about the nature of democracy (Scheuerman,
2006). Yet, the ‘relationship between the rule of law
and democracy is asymmetrical: the rule of law can
exist without democracy, but democracy needs the
rule of law, for otherwise democratically established
laws may be eviscerated at the stage of application by
not being followed’ (Tamanaha, 2004: 37).
David Dyzenhaus’s work is all about assembling the
pieces of this jigsaw puzzle together. Whether writing
about the South African experience, or emergency provi-
sions and the unwritten constitution, he is a meticulous
scholar who revisits the main theories in public law as
he discusses key cases and critiques judicial reasoning
relating to emergency powers (Dyzenhaus, 1999).
Dyzenhaus is not impressed by half-hearted judicial
commitment to the rule of law. In this recent publi-
cation, The Constitution of Law, he painstakingly scruti-
nises a government’s accountability when responding to
emergencies and terrorism. Dyzenhaus is not dismissive
of judicial responsibility in this response. He revives and
draws our attention to the Hobbesian notion of a judge
who is sensitive to dangers when the rule of law, which
‘secures the fabric of civil society, is under strain’ (2007, p. 12,
my emphasis).
1 Lord Hoffmann, A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68, at 97.
2 For a UK perspective see ss. 24–31 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which was considered
in the Belmarsh case, A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2004] QB 335, [2005]
2 WLR 87. For the US perspective see s. 213 of the 2001 US Patriot Act, in particular the ‘sneak and peak’
provisions. See also Rasul v. Bush 542 US (2004).
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On this point, Gearty’s work in the area informs
Dyzenhaus’s. Gearty correctly identifies three critical
paradoxes that lie at the heart of this strain, namely:
national security, democracy and political violence.
One of the reasons for the tension is the ‘misuse of
language in our political culture’ (2007, p. 111).
Terrorism, for example, has been, and continues to be,
an uncertain term. This ambiguity and the ‘creative
exploitation’ of the paradoxes allow for measures to be
adopted that are ‘exceptional and unprecedented [. . .] to
defend [the nation]’ (p. 119). As a civil libertarian, Gearty is
especially eager to maintain the ‘emancipatory and radi-
cal nature of civil liberties’, urging us to embrace the
democratic developments of the twentieth century, and
recall our commitment to the rule of law and human
rights (p. 111).
Dyzenhaus is especially preoccupied with ‘legal
spaces’ and ‘legal controls’. He identifies black holes
which comprise a space absent legal controls and grey
holes which constitute a space in which there are legal
controls, but they are inadequate. Grey holes provide a
semblance of legality and give government a basis to
argue that it is still governing in accordance with the
rule of law. It is the grey holes that worry Dyzenhaus
most. They are, he says, black in substance and, therefore,
even more dangerous for the rule of law than black holes.
For Dyzenhaus, therefore, the objective is to discover
ways out of the grey holes: ‘ways of responding to terror
in ways that break out of this insecurity-heightening,
democracy-corroding spiral’ (Loader and Walker, 2007,
p. 90). Throughout, Dyzenhaus refers to the ‘rule-of-law’
project, in which judges play a key role and make their
commitments explicit.
To appreciate Dyzenhaus’s concerns, this essay revi-
sits the notion of an ‘open society’, which emerged in
1989 with the collapse of Communist political structures
in the Eastern bloc. Immense changes in both western
and, in particular, central and eastern Europe, revived
questions about the highly contested notion of the rule
of law. Indeed, it was the abuses inherent in ‘closed
societies’ or totalitarian regimes which were the founda-
tions of the open society. This does, of course, ask us to
bear in mind the context within which developments
take place. Inspiration in post-1989 Europe was taken
from European and international developments, as well
as from more established democracies. It is worthwhile to
remind ourselves of the sources of the catalysts which
make the rule of law meaningful. Exploring further
Dyzenhaus’s notion of the unwritten constitution, the
essay examines the concept of the ‘invisible constitution’.
This notion was first introduced by the energetic and
far-reaching efforts of post-Communist courts, and is
one that provides useful insight into Dyzenhaus’s well-
researched, engaging and prescient work.
Open society
The idea of an ‘open society’ is one that is strongly
connected to the rule of law. ‘Open society’ specifically
refers to liberal democracies that are tolerant and that
adopt transparent and flexible political measures.
Popper, writing in 1945, defined an open society as
one in which political leaders can be overthrown with-
out the need for bloodshed (1945/1995). Significantly,
the distinction between an open and closed society
rested with the recognition of the role of responsibility
and accountability for personal choices. Popper was
referring to clear violations of civil liberties and free-
doms that occurred in a ‘closed society’, or totalitarian
regime. At the heart of the legal system that was imp-
osed on Communist states was fear. ‘Fear was the first
principle buttressing Soviet-style control. A key to com-
munist societies’ stability was the well-internalised fear
of the party-state and its seemingly omnipresent secur-
ity forces’ (Łos´ 2002, p. 169).
In a closed society, liberty does not rank very high
when compared to security. Laws are instrumental, far
from static, and their arbitrary application ensures that
society feels their reach in both public and private lives.
Some features of the totalitarian regime support the use
of terror for achieving the long-term goal of eliminating
any political opposition to the state order. For the post-
Communist world, the agreement that human rights
should be protected unconditionally was accompanied
by selected models of rule of law from more established
democracies. Although later criticised for being naive,
one could find little fault with the passion, enthusiasm
and belief in that a judiciary which boasts ‘confidence in
the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law’ could be
created (Scheppele, 2000).3 It is not in the scope of this
essay to examine the complexities of judicial systems in
transition, suffice it to say that ‘Communist ideas, pat-
terns of behaviour and institutions still pervade consti-
tutional developments’ (Sajo´, 1995, p. 253). Equally,
Dyzenhaus also draws on similar experiences, namely
the South African one, to demonstrate that judges in
both open and closed societies have an obligation to
the rule-of-law project. The judge in an open society
3 Even it seems, after a ‘bad’ decision. See Bush v. Gore 121 US 525, 539 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting), at the US
Supreme Court site at www.supremecourtus.gov (28 June 2007).
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should be sensitive to the project at all times, none more
so than in times of political instability.
Fear also is, unfortunately, a dreadful feature of
our open society. In an extreme form of insecurity,
anxiety and vulnerability we feel impotent and help-
less. Our helplessness hinders us from finding those
solutions that ‘could allow our politics to be lifted to
the level where power has already settled, so enabling
us to recapture and repossess control over forces shap-
ing our shared condition’ and defining the variety of
choices and boundaries to our freedom (Baumann, 2006,
p. 128). This is a particular concern for civil libertarians,
who find that ‘[a] tranquil state rooted in fear is not a free
society’ (Gearty, 2007, p. 119). Baumann notes:
‘If the idea of an ‘‘open society’’ originally stood for
the self-determination of a free society proud of its
openness, it now brings to most minds the terrify-
ing experience of heteronomous, vulnerable popu-
lations overwhelmed by forces they neither
control nor truly understand, horrified by their
own undefendability and obsessed with security
of their borders and of the population inside
them – since it is precisely the security inside
borders and of borders that eludes their grasp and
seems bound to stay beyond their reach forever.’
(Baumann, 2006, pp. 96–97).
In an attempt to address our fears we naturally turn to the
state to maintain law and order. Accompanying the fear
that affects liberal democracies is the challenge that
states undertake new and unusual methods to disci-
pline and punish. Following 9/11, the concern related
to these unique measures increased, causing certain
scholars to question political motives, and pondering
whether ‘we currently allow practices that go against
their original meaning’ (Kateb, 2006, p. 47). In a similar
vein, Baumann observes that the ‘plight of ‘stranger’,
cast and held in disturbingly underdefined ‘grey zone’
stretching between declared enemies and trusted
friends, has been at all times ambivalence incarnate’
(2006, p. 126).4 However, it is equally important to
note that for some scholars, such as Richardson, there
are doubts concerning ‘a great evolutionary leap in
September 2001, that the human race suddenly produced
a new brand of evildoers’ (2006, p. 13, my emphasis).
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; governments
through time have had to create legal responses to
violent movements within their borders. ‘We must
always remember, however, that terrorists cannot derail
our democracy by planting a bomb in our midst. Our
democracy can be derailed only if we conclude that it is
inadequate to protect us’ (p. 280).
The crux of the question rests with essence of the
regime itself. The separation of powers and judicial
review are two mechanisms to ensure government
responsibility. These mechanisms have been critically
analysed by scholars of public law, seeking an answer
about the controlling national power. Tushnet (2005),
for example, rejects both mechanisms, while others in
the area painstakingly analyse key case law to reveal
judicial commitment to the constitutive elements of
the legal authority, exploring the manner in which
precedent allows judges to rise to challenges to the
rule of law (Scheppele, 2000; Scheuerman, 2006).
Dyzenhaus reveals a different problematic that is
not isolated to the United Kingdom or the Common-
wealth. It is the claim that since 9/11 we have moved into
a state of permanent emergency and have abandoned or
are slowly abandoning the rule of law. As noted above,
tension between national security interests and protect-
ing civil liberties can be identified in many states’ his-
tories at different points in time. Ironically, our open
society is experiencing a crisis with the very issues that
comprise its beginnings. It is equally ironic that compar-
isons are drawn with the experiences that constitute the
inception of the open society. Paradoxically, while we
live in an open society, it is seemingly threatened by fear.
And because the fear is not entirely tangible, it appears
even more menacing and more demanding of a solution.
Those living in the most developed countries are
living in the most secure societies which ever existed, yet
at the same time we reveal obsessions about security-
related issues, linked to anxiety and fear (Baumann,
2006, p. 101). Polls taken after the 9/11 and London
terrorist attacks support this contention. ‘True to its
name, the paramount weapon of terrorism is sowing
terror’ (p. 107). It is asserted that we are dealing with a
different kind of terrorism, one that is ‘new’ and has a
‘more ominous face [. . .] in Europe’ (Baumann, 2006,
p. 108; Cowell and Bonner, 2007).5 Counter-terrorist
4 For example, concerning the United States, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) released a
report recently that outlines 2,467 incidents and experiences of anti-Muslim violence, discrimination and
harassment in 2006, the highest number of civil rights cases ever recorded in the Washington-based group’s
report. See the full report (of its kind) at www.cair.com/pdf/2007-Civil-Rights-Report.pdf.
5 The recent attack on Glasgow airport has provoked remarks reported by the US and British press, referring to
the ‘psychotic thought processes behind the attack’, or ‘it is clear a loose but deadly network of interlinked
operational cells has developed’ (Cowell and Bonner, 2007).
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measures are ‘openly and blatantly desecularized ver-
sion[s] of the totalitarian temptations that accompa-
nied the whole of modern history, being tested with
particular zeal and to most spectacular effect by the
communist and fascist movements of the century that
has just drawn to its close’ (Baumann, 2006, p. 115). As
pointed out by Gross and Ni Aola´in, ‘[t]he rush to
legislate means that it is not unusual that when emer-
gency legislation is initially adopted, no meaningful
debates over it take place’ (2007, p. 72). All of this seems
to paint a gloomy picture indeed, especially when we
consider Rosen’s observation that we are not very good
at digesting complicated information, making us more
impatient to make good decisions about complex
issues (2004, p. 15). This is particularly relevant when
we are driven by a ‘psychology of fear’ (p. 14). Thus, in the
current context, our rush to apprehend terrorists and
prevent future terrorist attacks has meant that our
respective governments have taken far-reaching steps
that potentially violate fundamental rights and freedoms
and call into question the balancing exercise between
national security and the protection of civil liberties.
The future of the open society
In maintaining law and order, it is clear that the state
may decide to introduce and impose extraordinary mea-
sures. For some, liberal democracies are always in a state
of vulnerability to this inevitable development. Carl
Schmitt, writing in the early twentieth century, reflected
on events in Weimar Germany (1919–1933), and argued
that traditional political and legal thought does not
address the problem of exception, which is composed
of an extreme danger to the existing political and legal
order. Schmitt’s work comprises an important part of
Dyzenhaus’s critique (and others working in the area) of
legal spaces. For Schmitt, it is not clear what measures
should be taken, but what is clear is that not every legal
norm can foresee, let alone contain, what measure might
be required. Schmitt found liberal-minded proponents of
this form of government naive (1922).
It is easy to forget that under the 1919 Weimar
constitution constitutional rights were not entrenched.
Discussions relating to constitutional rights occurred
within a different context, led by positivists who
stressed the idea of the ‘people’ rather than the indivi-
dual (Fuzer, 2004, p. 135). This meant that the:
‘German people’s sovereignty was always present in
the electorate’s votes in plebiscites, in parliamentary
and presidential elections, outlining the contours
of a parliament in which a vast legislative and
executive powers were to combine and which
only a few ‘‘checks and balances’’ were to counter.’
(Fuzer, 2004, p. 135)
In contrast, during this time, and in response
to developments in Weimar Germany, Kelsen went
further with his positivism, or the ‘pure theory of law’,
where the freedom of the people, as part of the state,
was most important of all. The application of any
norms beyond legal and positive ones was out of the
question. Not surprisingly, natural law interpretations
were rejected. As Dyzenhaus notes, ‘the state is totally
constituted by law’ (2007, p. 199), so when a political
entity acts outside the law, its acts cannot be attributed
to the state and they have no authority. Interestingly,
Schmitt, when writing about constitutional rights, held
two different positions in the course of developing his
ideas. While he expanded on the political dimension of
constitutions early on in his career, at the centre of his
argument basic rights and liberties could be found.
‘Restriction of the individual’s freedom could only
occur as an exception and even then it had to happen
in an assessable manner’ (Fuzer, 2004, p. 208). He would
later change his stance to accommodate the new poli-
tical situation.
Equally, it easy to overlook the fact that one of the
most important developments in the twentieth century
concerns international law and the role of the interna-
tional community. Most constitutions have provisions
on states of emergency that also protect civil liberties
and require constant parliamentary review of related
executive decisions (Scheppele, 2004). This is not to
deny that questions continue to plague the purported
limitations of the rule of law and the reach of the law in
controlling emergency powers. If we attempt to find
solutions at the European level, we are disappointed. In
most cases, the European Court of Human Rights has
left the question of emergency provisions to the states
under the margin of appreciation.6
Scheppele convincingly argues that we need to
note the historical and material circumstances that
existed in Weimar Germany, which resulted in the
failure of weak parliamentary democracies, not only
in Germany, but throughout continental Europe –
which do not exist in the present day. If we pursue
this further and examine events during times of sta-
bility, we discover that ‘emergency powers are in fact
more interesting, politically more revealing and more
6 Most cases concern Article 5 (personal liberty) of the European Convention on Human Rights. See, for
example, Leander v. Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 443 and Brogan v. United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHRR 117.
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analytically challenging when considered in periods
of ‘‘peace’’, and the everyday functioning of civil society’
(Neocleous, 2006, p. 95). Many examples can be found
in UK and US experiences with emergency provisions
during peacetime. This alternative critique introduces
another perspective with which to view the legal spaces
that have been identified by scholars working the area.
Prior to 9/11 most terrorist offences were dealt with by
US federal criminal law; this meant that terrorist sus-
pects were handled by the institutions that formed part
of the ordinary criminal justice system. In the United
Kingdom, the treatment of IRA suspects has been long
criticised along the lines of creating a separate criminal
law framework to deal with the ‘suspect community’
(Hillyard, 1995). The recognition and critique of these
developments warns against the temptation to discard
or dismiss the ‘rule-of-law’ project.
Invisible constitution
As noted above, Dyzenhaus supports the view of a judge
taking the role of a ‘weather forecaster’. He constructs a
framework for this role after carefully examining cases
from various common law jurisdictions to demonstrate
that the law provides a moral foundation for it. He
alleges inconsistency in adhering to a strict application
of the separation of powers or a principle of legality that
asks parliament to ‘confront what it is doing and accept
the political cost’7, saying that it reveals further divi-
sions concerning the value of equality as it pertains to
citizens and non-citizens. We see evidence of the truth
of his allegation in Canadian and Australian approaches
which divulge equally alarming developments.8 For
Dyzenhaus, principles derived from lesser-known cases
can provide a precedent for future commitment to
the ‘rule-of-law project’, especially when judicial un-
certainty and weakness are identified. His analysis of
the Belmarsh decision9 is an excellent example of how
judges have failed in their commitment despite hold-
ing the provisions in question unconstitutional. This
is one of the most critically engaging chapters of
Dyzenhaus’s book.
Dyzenhaus’s unwavering position related to the
commitment of all three branches of government to
the rule of law resonates with developments in
the post-Communist world. The former Hungarian
Constitutional Court president, Laszlo So´lyom, wrote
that ‘[o]f all constitutional principles, the rule of
law played a special, symbolic role: it represented the
essence of the system change, being the watershed
between the nondemocratic, nonconstitutional, socia-
list system and the new constitutional democracy’
(Scheppele, 2000; So´lyom and Brunner, 1999). So´lyom
refers to the Hungarian experience, where legal con-
tinuity and legal certainty guided the transition (and
can be a blueprint for developments in the region). It
could be argued that for Dyzenhaus, such enthusiasm
and commitment to the rule of law complements his
idea of the rule-of-law project. He argues that his:
‘conception of the rule of law is a rather bare
common law one, enriched by the way in which
such a conception has to be updated, most recently
because of the central place taken by an interna-
tional and domestic discourse of human rights in
our thinking about law.’ (2007, p.13)
The continental legal model that exists in post-
Communist states has experienced a similar inspira-
tion. Contrary to some views, Hungarian courts have
not ‘gone mad and forgotten wise counsel that the
law should be stable and uncertain, that judicial
review should be used sparingly, that overconstitutio-
nalisation of law may be too much of a good thing’
(Scheppele, 2000). The most novel way that this has
emerged has taken the form of the ‘invisible constitu-
tion’, which first arose in post-Communist Hungary.
This is not an idea that is necessarily rooted in positive
law, rather, it refers to the constitutional framework
that the Hungarian Constitutional Court has devel-
oped without speaking about a ‘system of values’
(So´lyom and Brunner, 1999, p. 5). Owing to important
historical reasons, the Hungarian Constitution elimi-
nated all ideological references. Incorporating a similar
approach to German courts, the Hungarian Court’s
post-1989 jurisprudence, in the protection of consti-
tutional rights, refers to the principle of legality
and continuity of law as a ‘revolution under the rule
of law’ (So´lyom and Brunner, 1999). In other words, it
is this guiding principle that holds together the case
law of the Court and the rule of law. The most power-
ful example of this can be found in the Court’s reason-
ing in the case in which the death penalty was
7 Lord Hoffmann in R v. Secretary for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131.
8 See Suresh v.Canada [2002] 1 SCR 3 andAl-Kateb v.Godwin [2004] 208 ALR 124. The Canadian Supreme Court has
been both hailed and criticised. A further reading reveals a commitment to the prohibition of torture but
ultimately an immigration policy that falls short of international standards (see Okafor and Okoronkwo, 2003).
9 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2004] QB 335, [2005] 2 WLR 87.
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abolished.10 This landmark case lucidly argues that the
human right to dignity is another key to the hidden
constitution. Despite being the source of controversy,
perceived by the Hungarian parliament as judicial
activism and clear encroachment on the legislative
and executive branches of power, the Court persevered
in constructing a constitutional framework that offers
a reliable and timeless standard. It adopted the Italian
Constitutional Court’s notion of the ‘living law’, where
the Court, when reviewing the content of the norm,
reviews the ‘meaning and the content that can be
attributed to it from the consistent and unitary practice
of applying the law’ (So´lyom and Brunner, 1999, p. 4).
Overall, the constitution viewed in its entirety is the
starting point. In the Hungarian experience, the Court’s
case law explains the theoretical bases of the Constitu-
tion and of the rights included in it in order to form a
coherent system with its decisions. The construction of
the ‘invisible constitution’ provides a reliable standard
of constitutionality beyond the Constitution, and
answers attempts to amend the document out of poli-
tical interests. Such a coherent system, it is understood,
does not conflict with a new document to be established
at any point in the future. The Constitutional Court
enjoys the freedom in this process, as long as it remains
within the framework of the concept of constitutional-
ity (Scheppele, 2006).
Concluding remarks
Ultimately, Dyzenhaus’s work concerns judges, and
their responsibility – constitutional duty – to uphold
the rule of law, especially when there are indications
that the government is withdrawing from the rule-of-
law project. His earlier work on South Africa (in fact
Dyzenhaus went before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission to argue that judges were accountable for
the facilitation of secrecy and arbitrariness that charac-
terised the apartheid system) challenges us with ques-
tions found at the core of political philosophy when he
dissects the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He
adopts a similar approach in his recent work.
His commitment resonates with the creation of
the open society. Perhaps some lessons can be learned
from revisiting the values upon which the open society
was created, when thinking about the current context in
which law and its legitimacy are discussed. For Hungary
and other states, ‘there is a good deal of improvisation
whenever the musicians find the score unpleasant’ (Sajo´,
1995, p. 267) that should challenge more established
democracies. While Dyzenhaus convincingly demon-
strates that responsibility need not be lost in times of
emergency, in order effectively to answer and address
the challenge of terrorism, it is important not to ignore
the context within which the law operates, as well as
that within which terrorism operates. As noted above,
terrorism will only fade when its sociopolitical roots are
destroyed, not by the punitive measures that are
imposed (Baumann, 2006, p. 109). Likewise, scholars of
terrorism, such as Crenshaw, note that the ‘study of
terrorism still lacks the foundation of extensive primary
data based on interviews and life histories of individuals
engaged in terrorism’ (2000, p. 405). Recently, this point
has been taken up by Campbell and Connolly, whose
sociolegal-based research on Northern Ireland reveals
that the law plays a key role in the repression and
mobilisation of violent challenges to the state and, inter-
estingly, demonstrates how a legal challenge can exist in
a grey zone (2006). The rule-of-law project – the invisible
constitution – ensures that unconstitutionality does not
go unnoticed (Sajo´, 1995), even when meeting seemingly
good intentions defined by national security interests,
recalling principles related to a legal culture and legal
consciousness peculiar to our civil society. ‘It is we the
people’s dedication to a culture of legality that is the
guardian of the constitution’ (Dyzenhaus, 2007, p. 233).
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The idea of human rights stands at a crossroads. On the
one hand, the language of rights has never been so
popular. Civil society organisations constantly hoist
the banner of human rights in their campaigns, while
international organisations refer relentlessly to the
central importance of rights in their work. Legal
instruments that attempt to encapsulate and give bind-
ing force to human rights have become integral ele-
ments of most legal systems. Academics and activists
consistently try to expand the reach and scope of rights
approaches: initially conceived as a narrow set of
minimal guarantees to protect core human liberties,
the language of rights have now become a conceptual
framework for articulating a vast range of normative
claims. Socioeconomic rights, equality rights, chil-
dren’s rights, cultural rights and other new varieties
of ‘rightspeak’ have all emerged in recent decades,
and have flourished across the globe. Human rights
appear to be the progressive ideology of choice for our
times.
However, on the other hand, human rights face
new and growing political challenges, especially since
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the events of 9/11. Many Western governments, partial
cheerleaders for human rights during the Cold War,
have begun to kick against the constraints which
human rights instruments impose on their freedom
of action. Ironically, some Western governments also
increasingly use the language of human rights to jus-
tify actions, such as the Iraq invasion, which rights
activists often bitterly oppose.1 This development
reflects the ever-increasing salience of human rights
ideals, but also demonstrates the existence of real
conflict and disagreement about their substance. In
addition, some states, such as Russia, increasingly indi-
cate a willingness to reject or repudiate the human
rights package. Fundamentalist religious ideologies
challenge the universalist and Enlightenment-rooted
assumptions underlying most contemporary accounts
of rights. The predominance of neoliberal ideologies
and increasing commodification of social goods since
1989 has denied political oxygen to some of the narra-
tives of human solidarity out of which elements of the
human rights idea originally grew. In other words, just
as the ideology of human rights attains significant new
levels of impact and support, it is attracting a backlash.
New debates have broken out as to who can speak in
the name of rights, and how the integrity of human
rights ideals can be maintained in the midst of this
uncertainty.2
The three books all reviewed here engage with
these issues in different ways. Gearty’s Can Human
Rights Survive? is a collection of essays that were ori-
ginally presented as the 2005 Hamlyn Lectures. This
volume is an ambitious undertaking, and a consider-
able contribution to the great tradition of Hamlyn
papers. In the first chapter, Gearty attempts to identify
what, if any, common, shared understanding can
underpin the idea of human rights in what he calls
the current ‘crisis of authority’, where foundational
or metaphysical accounts of human values have
largely succumbed to withering critique. He argues
that a ‘Darwinian’ sense of shared human compassion
is perhaps the only solid basis on which human rights
ideals can rest (pp. 40–50).3
Gearty then proceeds in the rest of the book to
examine how the ‘legalisation’ of rights (i.e. their con-
version into judicially enforceable legal norms) and the
incorporation of the language of rights within the
current discourse of ‘national security’ pose a serious
threat to the emancipatory potential of the human
rights idea. He sees human rights as beleaguered, resting
on shaky normative foundations and facing a life-threa-
tening crisis in the form of the current ‘War on Terror’.
This book attempts to explore how this ‘Esperanto of the
virtuous’ can survive and thrive despite these threats, via
the re-emphasising of the emancipatory, participatory
and ultimately compassionate roots of the idea of
human rights. In general, this volume represents per-
haps Gearty’s finest work: he returns to old and familiar
themes that have recurred throughout his work, such as
the dangers of the legalisation of rights and the rhetoric
of counter-terrorism, but his analysis has deepened and
become more nuanced.
Dembour, in Who Believes in Human Rights?, also
engages with some of these themes, except that her
focus is primarily on the application of the rights norms
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) by the European Court of Human Rights (here-
after ‘the Strasbourg court’) in its case-law. Her admirably
clear and focused introduction makes it clear that she
shares Gearty’s scepticism about the existence of any
basis of ‘universal universality’ on which to rest the
normative foundations of human rights ideas. However,
her approach differs from that of Gearty, in that Dembour
does not attempt to find any substitute basis for rights
ideology. She maintains a degree of suspicion about
the entire package of human rights ideals, while accept-
ing their potential usefulness as a form of rhetoric and
persuasion. She explores some of the major ‘classical
critiques’ of human rights ideology and applies these
critiques to how rights are institutionalised and protected
via the case-law of the Strasbourg court. Dembour con-
cludes that many of these critiques, including the realist,
radical feminist, utilitarian, Marxist and ‘particularist’/
anti-universalist perspectives, have considerable validity
when applied to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The
human rights case-law of the Court is riddled with nor-
mative gaps, uncertainties and multiple instances where
human rights law does not deliver on its emancipatory
potential.
Dembour moves on from this conclusion to discuss
the normative and ethical limits of rights jurisprudence,
and against this background she analyses human rights
scholarship and how it defines the idea of rights and
1 See the controversial views of Michael Ignatieff on the justifiability of extreme measures in certain circum-
stances to combat terrorism, in Ignatieff (2004). See also Conor Gearty’s attack on Ignatieff in response: Gearty
(2005). Gearty develops this criticism of Ignatieff’s views in Chapters 4 and 5 of Can Human Rights Survive?
2 See Douzinas (2000).
3 For a similar attempt to locate an alternative ‘universal’ basis for human rights, this time involving a
‘commitment to the rights of strangers’, see Langlois (2003).
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responds to these limitations. For her, four ‘schools’ of
human rights scholarship can be identified: the ‘natural’
scholars, who see rights as inherent and ‘given’; ‘delib-
erative’ scholars, who see rights as agreed norms settled
by a process of social and political debate; ‘protest’
scholars, who see rights as ideals to be fought for; and
‘discourse’ scholars, who see rights as indeterminate
norms that are consistently in the process of being
formulated and discussed. In a very interesting analysis,
Dembour proceeds to examine the interrelationship
between these different approaches to human rights.
For her, an approach based on ‘human rights nihilism’
and linked to the ‘discourse’ school is ultimately pre-
ferential: human rights may be useful as a ‘system of
persuasion’, but they are ultimately contested norms
with limited effect that are rooted in particular subjec-
tive assumptions, and which do not rest on any firm
normative foundation (pp. 274–75).
The final book is less ambitious in its philosophi-
cal ambitions than the first two, but no less interesting
for that. Greer in The European Convention on Human
Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects sets out to
examine the track record of the ECHR, its limits, suc-
cesses and achievements, as well as the evolving role of
the Strasbourg court. He argues that the purpose of the
Convention has changed: established at the beginning
of the Cold War to serve as a statement of basic shared
Western European values in response to Communist
authoritarianism, it has morphed into an ‘abstract con-
stitutional model’ for the European continent as a
whole, setting out a range of normative standards
which public institutions across Europe must strive
to meet.
While more upbeat in his assessment of what the
Convention has achieved than is Dembour, Greer shows
that the ECHR’s enforcement machinery, and in particu-
lar the Strasbourg court, has struggled to adjust to its
changed role. He examines how the shift to a constitu-
tional role has impacted upon the jurisprudence and
interpretative approach of the Court, but also how the
growing case-load has imposed intolerable burdens on
the functioning of the Court and has not been matched
by adjustments to the Convention’s barely adequate
machinery for ensuring state compliance. Greer concludes
this outstanding book by suggesting that this new ‘con-
stitutional’ role for the Court is here to stay: therefore, he
suggests that considerable adjustments need to be made to
the admissibility rules, practice and procedure and func-
tioning of the Court, as well as to the (currently very
limited) relationship between the Strasbourg institu-
tions and national human rights bodies.
Greer’s concerns are therefore more specific and
narrower than those of Gearty and even Dembour,
who also concentrates upon the Strasbourg jurispru-
dence but uses it for the purposes of her theoretical
arguments as a representative example of an institution
applying human rights standards. However, all three
books make substantial contributions to the existing
literature. All three are excellent pieces of human rights
scholarship: each in their own way will constitute
important points of reference for some time to come.
They also have the immense virtue of being well-
written, clear and accessible: arguments are made with
punch and style, with the Gearty and Dembour books
being particularly readable and engaging.
Indeed, from the perspective of a student, all three
books strike the happy balance of combining rigorous
argument with clear exposition. For academics, these
books also have a welcome willingness to take contro-
versial positions. Greer breaks ranks with much NGO
opinion in questioning whether the right of individual
petition to the Strasbourg court should remain open to
all potential litigants. He suggests that this is now
untenable given the volume of the Court’s case-load:
instead, the Court needs to be able to act as a constitu-
tional court in selecting significant cases while reject-
ing others that are more appropriately dealt with
elsewhere, a position which with I agree. Gearty reiter-
ates his oft-expressed scepticism about the legalisation
of rights and is not afraid to highlight the very pro-
blematic distinction between terrorism and political
violence. Dembour assaults sacred cows left, right
and centre: her challenge to foundationalist accounts
of rights, while not altogether new,4 is bracing, well-
argued and refreshingly nuanced. She also brings
anthropological and philosophical perspectives to bear
in her analysis that are often overlooked in contempor-
ary human rights scholarship, including the always
interesting work of Guy Haarscher.5 Her book is
also notable for her use of personal experience and
individual examples to highlight the real people behind
the statistics of inadmissibility decisions and other
court determinations.
As ever, there are parts of all three books that could
have been expanded, or better developed. I would have
liked to see Gearty take forward the idea of human
rights being founded on a Darwinian sense of compas-
sion, and apply this to other contexts apart from
4 See e.g. the discussion in Gaete (1993); see also Douzinas (2000); Baxi (2002).
5 See e.g. Haarscher (1993); Haarscher and Fyrdman (2002).
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his usual safe terrain of the legalisation of rights and
national security. How, for example, could this idea
be applied in the context of socioeconomic rights?
However, the format of the Hamlyn lectures perhaps
precluded this, and we may have to wait for subsequent
works. Dembour could perhaps have developed her
concept of ‘rights nihilism’ a little: does it differ very
much from Rorty’s pragmatic scepticism, despite its
roots in Nietzsche’s subjectivism? Much of Greer’s
text has already seen the light of day in article form:
this means that some of the separate chapters are
largely self-contained and adhere to the framework of
their progenitor articles. This means that in places
overarching ideas are not as fully developed as perhaps
ideally they would be: for example, I would have liked
to see more on the ‘abstract constitutional role’ the
Strasbourg court is now playing. Greer argues that its
functions increasingly mirror the constitutional review
conducted by the US Supreme Court and German
Constitutional Court. I tend to agree with him, but
can the often Delphic and case-specific findings of the
Court play a similar role as the more tangible norm-
setting role of national constitutional courts? Does
Strasbourg ultimately have the authority and legiti-
macy to play such a role?
However, pointing out how arguments could or
should have been developed further is the luxury of
the reviewer: all three books may not be perfectly com-
plete, but all generate ideas, fresh insights and new
perspectives of real value. What then can we take from
these useful pieces of human rights scholarship? Given
the simultaneous position of strength and weakness that
human rights find themselves in at present, as outlined
in the opening paragraphs of this review, do the argu-
ments made in these books stand up? Do they offer a
coherent account of where human rights ideas find
themselves now, and where they might find themselves
in ten or twenty years’ time?
At the time of the drafting of the Universal Decla-
ration in 1948 and the subsequent UN human rights
treaties of the 1960s and 1970s, human rights texts were
the product of a cross-cultural, cross-national dialogue:
they were intended to serve as a statement of agreed
shared values that could unite a divided world in agree-
ment on certain basic minimal entitlements. For their
framers, they perhaps were never meant to be anything
else. However, with the revigoration of natural law
philosophies in the wake of World War II, and the
hugely influential work by Rawls, Dworkin and others
which gave new and vibrant life to liberal political
philosophy, the human rights idea seemed to encap-
sulate and give concrete shape to these exciting new
normative currents. Even philosophical perspectives
rooted in more critical traditions, such as Habermasian
‘discourse theory’,6 Derridian deconstructionism and
Foucaultian post-structuralism, have a tendency to
reach for concepts rooted in the human rights tradition
when it comes to outlining a positive agenda of pro-
gressive change.7 Gearty exaggerates when he says that
human rights have become a new ‘secular religion’:
however, as I have suggested above, it has replaced
socialism and other ideologies as the progressive doc-
trine de jour. However, in an era apparently dominated
by post-modern critique on the one hand, and a return
to the easy certainties of total religious belief on the
other, does the human rights idea rest on solid norma-
tive foundations? Or is it essentially hollow in nature,
and therefore vulnerable to its abuse, misappropriation
and rejection?
Gearty and Dembour both share the belief that
‘grand narrative’ universalist theories of rights cannot
stand up to post-modernist critique. Gearty, however,
argues that his concept of ‘Darwarian universalism’,
which is predicated upon the existence of a shared
sense of compassion, can step into the normative gap:
in the alternative, at least the lowest common deno-
minator of this idea of human compassion can provide
a common point of agreement for all who wish to come
under the human rights umbrella. This is an attractive
idea, and is well developed in Can Human Rights Survive?.
However, can the vague and uncertain concept of com-
passion really provide the idea of human rights with
enough normative clarity?
Compassion is a vague and imprecise emotion, and
it will often be unclear what compassion for the under-
dog actually requires. Conflicting stances on many
issues can readily be justified by citing compassionate
impulses. The invasion of Iraq, the detention without
trail of alleged terrorists, access to abortion or the rights
of defendants within a criminal justice system are all
examples: in each case, ‘compassion’ can be used as a
justification for almost any stance that one wants to
adopt. However, it cannot by itself give human rights
the hard and clear definition that is required, if the idea
of rights is to give firm normative guidance on difficult
and controversial questions. More is needed.
6 The roots of much of Habermas’s theoretical framework lies in the critical thought of the Frankfurt School;
see McCarthy (1979).
7 See for example the indirect affirmation of certain human rights concepts in Derrida (2001). See also the
interesting discussion in Lindgren (2000).
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I would suggest that when human rights argu-
ments are deployed to push for governments to adopt
or to avoid a particular course of action, much of their
normative and emotional appeal lies in their claim to
combine both compassion and rationality in a coherent
package. If one for example argues for greater respect for
the human rights of asylum seekers, one is arguing (a)
for more compassionate treatment, but also (b) for treat-
ment that is founded on a more coherent set of moral
principles than that currently being inflicted. Human
rights claims are more than emotional appeals to the
good nature or conscience of government: they contain
a morally rationalist component, as well as an emotive
dimension.
This claim to contain a rational dimension, embo-
died in legal requirements such as the proportionality
test, gives added force to rights arguments. This rational
component is also relied upon to define what course of
action best complies with rights standards, and to give
precision to human rights claims that mere appeals to
compassion lack. However, this appeal to rational prin-
ciples means that rights claims invariably place some
reliance upon the very Enlightenment-rooted philoso-
phical constructs that Gearty suggests lack authority in
the post-modern era. As a result, I am sceptical whether
the human rights edifice can be built up from Gearty’s
compassion principle alone.
Indeed, Dembour is sceptical about the existence of
any objective normative foundation for rights ideology,
hence her ‘rights nihilism’. Indeed, she is sceptical about
the idea of human rights in general, seeing its primary
value as a useful rhetorical tool to be deployed where
appropriate for progressive ends. She bases her scep-
ticism on her extensive critique of the case-law of the
Strasbourg court. Dembour makes a questionable logi-
cal jump here, moving from identifying the limits and
gaps of the Strasbourg jurisprudence to a wider philo-
sophical critique of the human rights idea in general.
The deficiencies of the Strasbourg jurisprudence may
give rise to questions about the usefulness of institutio-
nalising rights via a legal framework. However, it does
not necessary indict the human rights idea itself, which
is of course separable and often much more capable
of having an emancipatory impact outside of legal
frameworks.8 In other words, Dembour relies too
much on a critique of a specific legal framework in
making a wider case about human rights thinking in
general. Nevertheless, her critique of human rights ideol-
ogy has considerable force, especially since the aim of
much of the human rights movement is to embed rights
in legal structures such as the ECHR. However, if Dem-
bour is correct in arguing that the human rights idea is
devoid of real objective normative force, then can it be
sustained in the face of competing ideologies?
Dembour focuses on predominantly ‘progressive’
critiques of rights, but notably absent from her analysis
are the challenges that are made against human rights
by conservative, fundamentalist or authoritarian critics
of rights. These perspectives are notable for their absence
from most academic analysis, but in practice are often
politically very potent. At the heart of these critiques
usually lies an assertion of subjective values at the
expense of what is usually presented as a false or hollow
cosmopolitan universalism: the needs of a particular
national group, or a particular belief, or a particular
‘way of life’ are presented as more deserving of protec-
tion than universal rights norms. The post-modern cri-
tical embrace of subjectivity finds an uncomfortable
echo in these conservative assaults upon rights values.9
If Dembour’s ‘human rights nihilism’ is the position
to which the ‘crisis of authority’ has lead us, there may
be a price to be paid if the human rights project can no
longer be credibly seen as articulating objective norms of
universal validity. Why should the ‘discourse’ of human
rights command any more respect than the particularist
discourses of nationality, religion, culture, values and
even race? If the idea of human rights becomes just one
more ideology, then it may lose its ‘aura’ of normative
superiority. This is perhaps why Gearty wishes to find
some basis for the human rights ideal in the idea of
human compassion. Dembour is less concerned about
this prospect, welcoming greater normative scepticism
about rights. However, it remains to be seen whether
the appeal of human rights ideology can survive the
potential loss of its ‘aura’.
This potential loss of ‘aura’ could also afflict the
delicate and somewhat precarious structure of inter-
national human rights institutions. Even well-established
8 See Meckled-Garcia and Cali (2005). Dembour contributes an interesting chapter to this excellent collection.
9 Conservative commentators have been very slow to use the rhetoric and conceptual armoury of post-
modernism to challenge human rights ideology, mainly because ‘mainstream’ conservative thinkers tend
to reject many of the tenets of post-modernism, in particular in the Anglo-American sphere. However, over
the last decade, nationalist and hard-right commentators now increasingly use the language of value
scepticism and some of the tropes of post-modernist thought to critique what they see as false cosmopolitan
universalism. See Antonio (2000); see also the discussion of the writings of Alain De Benoist in Griffin (2000).
For an analysis of the relationship between post-modernism and Islamist fundamentalist thought, see
Sardar (1997).
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human rights institutions such as the ECHR and its
enforcement machinery remain vulnerable to political
winds. If the human rights ideal were to become
tarnished, or become one more ideology amongst many,
the status and prestige of the Strasbourg mechanisms
will increasingly be exposed to new challenges. This is
already happening: the European Court of Human Rights
is coming under new forms of political pressure, especially
from Western European governments concerned about
the terrorist threat10 and from Russia’s increasingly overt
hostility to the Strasbourg institutions. In addition, the
Strasbourg court is to an extent a victim of its own success:
as Greer discusses, with its huge case-load, the Court is
buckling under the strain of living up to the expectations
that it has successfully generated over the last two decades.
Taken together, these factors combine to create an increas-
ingly turbulent climate for the Court, notwithstanding its
status as one of the more respected and effective human
rights institutions in the world.
This should be a source of concern to those well
disposed towards the human rights ideal, even if only in
a qualified and provisional way. Dembour’s critique of
the Court makes too much of the inevitable compro-
mises, caution and judicial tentativeness that come with
the legalisation of rights via a judicial (or any other)
framework. She herself notes that the European Court
of Human Rights has been a valuable agent for progres-
sive change. Human rights institutions will inevitably
disappoint, to some extent. However, they are essential
for infusing human rights concepts into the blood-
stream of mainstream legal and political discourse.
Greer’s book is invaluable in discussing the ways in
which the Strasbourg court has achieved some success
in achieving this gradual transfusion over the last few
decades, and in exploring how this relative success can
be maintained and followed though. However, it may be
that the future of the Court may depend as much on the
ideology of human rights maintaining its current ‘aura’
as on the institutional dynamics that Greer discusses. In
other words, the current difficulties that the Court finds
itself in are linked to the wider issues affecting human
rights, a dimension that perhaps Greer underplays in his
otherwise excellent analysis.
The idea of human rights has reached its current
salience in an era of accelerating neoliberalism, post-
modern erosion of attempts to construct universalist
normative projects, and the apparent resurgence of par-
ticularist alternative ideologies. Some of the current
appeal of human rights ideology may stem from how
rights thinking is both linked to these trends and yet also
is opposed to them in interesting and complex ways. The
human rights idea can accommodate a wide diversity of
different philosophical viewpoints, as Dembour shows.
It gives expression to common human needs and bonds,
as Gearty argues. The institutions established to protect
rights may have the capacity to adopt and change over
time, as Greer illustrates. However, in the final analysis,
human rights may be inextricably intertwined with the
Enlightenment project, which may prove to be an inher-
ent strength or considerable weakness in the years
ahead.11
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